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BUFPALO LAW REVIEWU
an identical situation in favor of the wife, adopting the legal fiction that the
annulment "related back" to the beginning of a marriage and the marriage was
considered never to have existed.9 Even in that case, however, the legal fiction
was modified, since the husband was required to pay only from the time of the
annulment rather than throughout the entire second marriage. 10
The Court pointed out that the decision in the Sleicher case was the only
means of allowing the wife a source of support, since at that time no support
could be had from an anulled marriage." However, after the Sleicher case, the
Civil Practice Act was amended to permit a court to grant support in an annul2
ment action.1
The fundamental function of alimony is to provide support for a wife not
otherwise supported, and in New York alimony automatically ceases upon
remarriage; 13 the subsequent fortunes of the remarriage do not affect this.' 4 The
purpose of the Sleicher holding was only to remedy the one situation in which
a wife had no source of support. By the amendment of the Civil Practice Act the
legislature itself corrected the defect; thus the Court of Appeals felt that the
justification for the Sleicher decision had ended. Al in all normal cases of remarriage under New York law, the wife must look only to her last husband for
support.
The Court recognized the unfortunate repercussions of their decision in the
instant case, since the second husband had died while the action was pending,
but nevertheless felt that the plaintiff was "no different from any other woman
whose source of support has come to an end through death."'r
Medical Care of Children
In a proceeding by the Commissioner of Social Welfare to obtain custody
of a twelve year old boy whose father, because of his personal philosophy, refused
to allow an operation on the son's hairlip and cleft palate, the Court (reversing
the Appellate Division) 16 reinstated the Children's Court decision. 17 Although
9. Id. at 366, 167 N.E. at 502.
10. Id. at 371, 167 N. E. at 503.
11. See Jones v. Brinsmade, 183 N. Y. 258, 76 N. E. 22 (1905).
12. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1140-a.
13. It would seem that New York is in the minority on this point. The
majority of courts hold that remarriage is a ground for modification, but does
not automatically stop alimony. Morgan v. Morgan, 211 Ala. 7, 99 So. 185 (1924).
See annot. 64 A. L. R. 1273 (1929).
14. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066 (1920).
15. 308 N. Y. at 226, 124 N. E. 2d at 295.
16. In re Seiferth, Jr., 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 35 (4th Dep't 1955)
17. 127 N. Y. S. 2d 63 (1954).
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all courts had awarded custody to the Commissioner, the Children's Court wished
the Commissioner to acquaint the child with the benefits of the operation,18
whereas the Appellate Division would have required the operation.
The child in question is now fourteen years old. He believes, as does his
father, who opposed the operation, that his hairlip and deft palate can be cured
only by "forces in the universe," and that any surgery would have to be completely undone in order to effect a cure. The Court of Appeals held,19 that under
the circumstances the trial court's discretion should be respected, since the trial
court had first hand knowledge of the facts and could best be relied on for an
equitable decision. The Children's Court has jurisdiction to order such an operation,2° but it believed more harm would result to the child than would be
21
obviated by it because of the boy's mental attitude.
The dissenters in the Court of Appeals believed that the majority was overlooking the main point of the case: that the child was (and is) "neglected" according to the law, and the child's wishes are irrelevant. The child's acquiescence in his
22
parent's neglect does not "render it permissible." As did the Appellate Division,
the dissenters apparently overlook the fact that the statute provides that "the
court in its discretion . . . may cause any person within its jurisdiction to be

examined," 23 and "... a suitable order may be made for the treatment ... of such
child. .. ,24 (emphasis supplied).
Religioies Upbringing of Children
In an appeal from an order modifying a judgment of separation, eliminating
a condition that the child be brought up in the Roman Catholic religion and
instead directing the child be permitted to attend the church of his own choice,
and further, if he so chose, to transfer from the parochial school he was then
attending to a public school, the modification was upheld, per curiam; Judges
Desmond and Conway dissenting.25
The wife, a Christian Scientist, had entered into an antenuptial agreement to
bring up all children in the faith of her husband, a Roman Catholic. In 1949 the
18. Once acquainted with its advantages, the boy may decide for himself to
undergo the operation.
19. 309 N. Y. 80, 127 N. E. 2d 820 (1955).
20. N. Y. Children's Court Act § 2 (4), which grants Children's Court jurisdiction of neglected children. A neglected child is defined as one whose parents
refuse to provide necessary medical or surgical care.
21. Note 17, supra.
22. Note 16, supra.
23. N. Y. CHILDREN'S CouRT AcT § 24.
24. Ibid.
25. Martin v. Martin, 308 N. Y. 136, 123 N. E. 2d 812 (954).

